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Abstract
This paper studies a Stackelberg type symmetric dynamic n-players zero-sum game.
There is one leader and n   1 followers. Players have the symmetric payoﬀ functions.
The game is a two-stages game. In the ﬁrst stage the leader determines the value of its
strategic variable. In the second stage the followers determine the values of their strategic
variables given the value of the leader’s strategic variable. In the static game, on the other
hand, all players simultaneously determine the values of their strategic variable. We do not
assume diﬀerentiability of payoﬀ functions. This paper shows that the sub-game perfect
equilibrium of the Stackelberg type symmetric dynamic zero-sum game is equivalent to
the equilibrium of the static game if and only if the game is fully symmetric.
Keywords: Stackelberg equilibrium, leader, follower, dynamic symmetric zero-sum game.
1 Introduction
We examine the relation between the Stackelberg equilibrium of dynamic game and the equi-
librium of the static game in a multi-players zero-sum game, and show that the Stackelberg
equilibrium of a dynamic zero-sum game and the equilibrium of the static zero-sum game are
equivalent if and only if the game is fully symmetric. The Stackelberg equilibrium of dynamic
This work was supported by Japan Society for the Promotion of Science KAKENHI Grant Number 15K03481
and 18K01594.
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game and the equilibrium of the static game are equivalent in a two-person zero-sum game1.
We extend this analysis to more general multi-players zero-sum game. We do not assume
diﬀerentiability of payoﬀ functions. However, we do not assume that the payoﬀ functions are
not diﬀerentiable. We do not use diﬀerentiability of payoﬀ functions.
In the next section, using a model of relative proﬁt maximization in an oligopoly with
four ﬁrms, we show that the Stackelberg equilibrium is not equivalent to the static (Cournot)
equilibrium in the following cases which are not fully symmetric.
1. All ﬁrms are asymmetric, that is, they have diﬀerent cost functions.
2. Two followers are symmetric, that is, they have the same cost functions.
3. Three followers are symmetric.
4. The leader and one follower are symmetric.
5. The leader and two followers are symmetric.
The Stackelberg equilibrium is equivalent to the static (Cournot) equilibrium if and only if all
ﬁrms are symmetric, that is, they have the same cost functions.
In Section 3 we show the main result. All players have symmetric payoﬀ functions. One
player is the leader and other players are followers. The game is a two-stages game as follows;
1. In the ﬁrst stage the leader determines the value of its strategic variable.
2. In the second stage the followers determine the values of their strategic variables given
the value of the leader’s strategic variable.
On the other hand, in the static game all players simultaneously determine the values of their
strategic variables. We show that the equilibrium of the Stackelberg type dynamic game and
the equilibrium of the static game are equivalent if the game is fully symmetric.
2 Example: relative profit maximization in a
Stackelberg oligopoly
In the example in this section we consider relative proﬁt maximization in an oligopoly2.
1Please see, for example, Korzhyk et. al. (2014), Ponssard and Zamir (1973), Tanaka (2014) and Yin et. al.
(2010)
2About relative proﬁt maximization in an oligopoly see Matsumura, Matsushima and Cato (2013), Vega-
Redondo (1997), Satoh and Tanaka (2014a) and Satoh and Tanaka (2014b). In this example payoﬀ functions
are diﬀerentiable.
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2.1 Case 1: four firms are different each other
Suppose a four ﬁrms Stackelberg oligopoly with a homogeneous good. There are Firms A, B,
C and D. The outputs of the ﬁrms are xA, xB , xC and xD. The price of the good is p. The
inverse demand function is
p D a   xA   xB   xC   xD; a > 0:
The cost functions of the ﬁrms are cAx2A, cBx2B , cCx2C and cDx2D. cA, cB , cC and cD are
positive constants. We assume that cA, cB , cC and cD are diﬀerent each other. The relative
proﬁt of Firm A is
'A D pxA   cAx2A  
1
3
.pxB   cBx2B C pxC   cCx2C C pxD   cDx2D/:
The relative proﬁt of Firm B is
'B D pxB   cBx2B  
1
3
.pxA   cAx2A C pxC   cCx2C C px2D   cDx2D/:
The relative proﬁt of Firm C is
'C D pxC   cCx2C  
1
3
.pxA   cAx2A C pxB   cBx2B C pxD   cDx2D/;
The relative proﬁt of Firm D is
'D D pxD   cDx2D  
1
3
.pxA   cAx2A C pxB   cBx2B C pxC   cCx2C /:
The ﬁrms maximize their relative proﬁts. We see
'A C 'B C 'C C 'D D 0:
Thus, the game is a zero-sum game. Firm A is the leader and Firms B, C and D are followers.
In the ﬁrst stage of the game Firm A determines xA, and in the second stage Firms B, C and D
determine xB , xC and xD given xA.
Nash equilibrium of the static game
The equilibrium outputs are
xA D acB.cC .27cD C 18/C 18cD C 12/C a.cC .18cD C 12/C 12cD C 8/
1
;
xB D acC .cA.27cD C 18/C 18cD C 12/C a.cA.18cD C 12/C 12cD C 8/
1
;
xC D acB.cA.27cD C 18/C 18cD C 12/C a.cA.18cD C 12/C 12cD C 8/
1
;
xD D acB..27cA C 18/cC C 18cA C 12/C a..18cA C 12/cC C 12cA C 8/
1
;
where
1 DcB.cC .cA.54cD C 54/C 54cD C 48/C cA.54cD C 48/C 48cD C 40/
C cC .cA.54cD C 48/C 48cD C 40/C cA.48cD C 40/C 40cD C 32:
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Sub-game perfect equilibrium of the dynamic game
The equilibrium outputs are
xA D 1
1s
Œ3a.3cB C 2/.3cC C 2/.3cD C 2/.27cBcC cD C 27cC cD C 27cBcD C 20cD
C 27cBcC C 20cC C 20cB C 12/;
xB D 1
1s
Œ3a.3cC C 2/.3cD C 2/.81cAcBcC cD C 54cBcC cD C 81cAcC cD
C 42cC cD C 81cAcBcD C 42cBcD C 72cAcD C 32cD C 81cAcBcC C 42cBcC C 72cAcC
C 32cC C 72cAcB C 32cB C 60cA C 24/;
xC D 1
1s
Œ3a.3cB C 2/.3cD C 2/.81cAcBcC cD C 54cBcC cD C 81cAcC cD
C 42cC cD C 81cAcBcD C 42cBcD C 72cAcD C 32cD C 81cAcBcC C 42cBcC C 72cAcC
C 32cC C 72cAcB C 32cB C 60cA C 24/;
xD D 1
1s
Œ3a.3cB C 2/.3cC C 2/.81cAcBcC cD C 54cBcC cD C 81cAcC cD C 42cC cD C 81cAcBcD
C 42cBcD C 72cAcD C 32cD C 81cAcBcC C 42cBcC C 72cAcC C 32cC C 72cAcB C 32cB
C 60cA C 24/;
where
1s D2.2187cAc2Bc2C c2D C 2187c2Bc2C c2D C 4374cAcBc2C c2D C 3807cBc2C c2D
C 2187cAc2C c2D C 1620c2C c2D C 4374cAc2BcC c2D C 3807c2BcC c2D C 8262cAcBcC c2D
C 6264cBcC c2D C 3888cAcC c2D C 2556cC c2D C 2187cAc2Bc2D C 1620c2Bc2D C 3888cAcBc2D
C 2556cBc2D C 1728cAc2D C 1008c2D C 4374cAc2Bc2C cD C 3807c2Bc2C cD C 8262cAcBc2C cD
C 6264cBc2C cD C 3888cAc2C cD C 2556c2C cD C 8262cAc2BcC cD C 6264c2BcC cD
C 14904cAcBcC cD C 9936cBcC cD C 6696cAcC cD C 3936cC cD C 3888cAc2BcD C 2556c2BcD
C 6696cAcBcD C 3936cBcD C 2880cAcD C 1520cD C 2187cAc2Bc2C C 1620c2Bc2C
C 3888cAcBc2C C 2556cBc2C C 1728cAc2C C 1008c2C C 3888cAc2BcC C 2556c2BcC
C 6696cAcBcC C 3936cBcC C 2880cAcC C 1520cC C 1728cAc2B
C 1008c2B C 2880cAcB C 1520cB C 1200cA C 576/:
TheNash equilibrium of the static game and the sub-game perfect equilibrium of the dynamic
game are not equivalent.
2.2 Case 2: the leader and one follower are symmetric
Assume cD D cA.
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Nash equilibrium of the static game
The equilibrium outputs are
xA D a.3cB C 2/.3cC C 2/
2.9cAcBcC C 9cBcC C 9cAcC C 8cC C 12cAcB C 10cB C 10cA C 8/;
xB D a.3cA C 2/.3cC C 2/
2.9cAcBcC C 9cBcC C 9cAcC C 8cC C 12cAcB C 10cB C 10cA C 8/;
xC D a.3cA C 2/.3cB C 2/
2.9cAcBcC C 9cBcC C 9cAcC C 8cC C 12cAcB C 10cB C 10cA C 8/;
xD D a.3cA C 2/.3cB C 2/
2.9cAcBcC C 9cBcC C 9cAcC C 8cC C 12cAcB C 10cB C 10cA C 8/:
Sub-game perfect equilibrium of the dynamic game
The equilibrium outputs are
xA D 3a.3cB C 2/.27cBc
2
C C 27c2C C 54cBcC C 40cC C 20cB C 12/
2
;
xB D 3a.3cC C 2/.27cAcBcC C 18cBcC C 27cAcC C 14cC C 36cAcB C 16cB C 30cA C 12/
2
;
xC D 3a.3cB C 2/.27cAcBcC C 18cBcC C 27cAcC C 14cC C 36cAcB C 16cB C 30cA C 12/
2
;
xD D 3a.3cB C 2/.27cAcBcC C 18cBcC C 27cAcC C 14cC C 36cAcB C 16cB C 30cA C 12/
2
;
where
2 D2.243cAc2Bc2C C 243c2Bc2C C 486cAcBc2C C 423cBc2C C 243cAc2C
C 180c2C C 648cAc2BcC C 522c2BcC C 1188cAcBcC C 828cBcC C 540cAcC C 328cC
C 432cAc2B C 252c2B C 720cAcB C 380cB C 300cA C 144/:
TheNash equilibrium of the static game and the sub-game perfect equilibrium of the dynamic
game are not equivalent.
2.3 Case 3: two followers are symmetric
Assume cD D cC .
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Nash equilibrium of the static game
The equilibrium outputs are
xA D a.3cB C 2/.3cC C 2/
2.9cAcBcC C 12cBcC C 9cAcC C 10cC C 9cAcB C 10cB C 8cA C 8/;
xB D a.3cA C 2/.3cC C 2/
2.9cAcBcC C 12cBcC C 9cAcC C 10cC C 9cAcB C 10cB C 8cA C 8/;
xC D a.3cA C 2/.3cB C 2/
2.9cAcBcC C 12cBcC C 9cAcC C 10cC C 9cAcB C 10cB C 8cA C 8/;
xD D a.3cB C 2/.3cC C 2/
2.9cAcBcC C 12cBcC C 9cAcC C 10cC C 9cAcB C 10cB C 8cA C 8/:
Sub-game perfect equilibrium of the dynamic game
The equilibrium outputs are
xA D 1
3
Œ3a.3cA C 2/.3cB C 2/.3cC C 2/.27cAcBcC C 27cBcC C 27cAcC
C 20cC C 27cAcB C 20cB C 20cA C 12/;
xB D 1
3
Œ3a.3cA C 2/.3cC C 2/.81c2AcBcC C 135cAcBcC C 42cBcC C 81c2AcC C 114cAcC C 32cC
C 81c2AcB C 114cAcB C 32cB C 72c2A C 92cA C 24/;
xC D 1
3
Œ3a.3cA C 2/.3cB C 2/.81c2AcBcC C 135cAcBcC C 42cBcC C 81c2AcC C 114cAcC C 32cC
C 81c2AcB C 114cAcB C 32cB C 72c2A C 92cA C 24/;
xD D 1
3
Œ3a.3cB C 2/.3cC C 2/.81c2AcBcC C 135cAcBcC C 42cBcC C 81c2AcC C 114cAcC C 32cC
C 81c2AcB C 114cAcB C 32cB C 72c2A C 92cA C 24/;
where
3 D2.2187c3Ac2Bc2C C 6561c2Ac2Bc2C C 5994cAc2Bc2C C 1620c2Bc2C
C 4374c3AcBc2C C 12069c2AcBc2C C 10152cAcBc2C C 2556cBc2C C 2187c3Ac2C
C 5508c2Ac2C C 4284cAc2C C 1008c2C C 4374c3Ac2BcC C 12069c2Ac2BcC C 10152cAc2BcC
C 2556c2BcC C 8262c3AcBcC C 21168c2AcBcC C 16632cAcBcC C 3936cBcC C 3888c3AcC
C 9252c2AcC C 6816cAcC C 1520cC C 2187c3Ac2B C 5508c2Ac2B C 4284cAc2B
C 1008c2B C 3888c3AcB C 9252c2AcB C 6816cAcB C 1520cB C 1728c3A
C 3888c2A C 2720cA C 576/:
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TheNash equilibrium of the static game and the sub-game perfect equilibrium of the dynamic
game are not equivalent.
2.4 Case 4: the leader and two followers are symmetric
Assume cD D cC D cA.
Nash equilibrium of the static game
The equilibrium outputs are
xA D a.3cB C 2/
2.3cAcB C 5cB C 3cA C 4/; xB D
a.3cA C 2/
2.3cAcB C 5cB C 3cA C 4/;
xC D a.3cB C 2/
2.3cAcB C 5cB C 3cA C 4/; xD D
a.3cB C 2/
2.3cAcB C 5cB C 3cA C 4/:
Sub-game perfect equilibrium of the dynamic game
The equilibrium outputs are
xA D 3a.3cB C 2/.27c
2
AcB C 54cAcB C 20cB C 27c2A C 40cA C 12/
4
;
xB D 3a.3cA C 2/.27c
2
AcB C 54cAcB C 16cB C 27c2A C 44cA C 12/
4
;
xC D 3a.3cB C 2/.27c
2
AcB C 54cAcB C 16cB C 27c2A C 44cA C 12/
4
;
xD D 3a.3cB C 2/.27c
2
AcB C 54cAcB C 16cB C 27c2A C 44cA C 12/
4
;
where
4 D2.243c3Ac2B C 891c2Ac2B C 954cAc2B C 252c2B C 486c3AcB C 1611c2AcB C 1548cAcB
C 380cB C 243c3A C 720c2A C 628cA C 144/:
TheNash equilibrium of the static game and the sub-game perfect equilibrium of the dynamic
game are not equivalent.
2.5 Case 5: three followers are symmetric
Assume cD D cC D cB .
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Nash equilibrium of the static game
The equilibrium outputs are
xA D a.3cB C 2/
2.3cAcB C 3cB C 5cA C 4/; xB D
a.3cA C 2/
2.3cAcB C 3cB C 5cA C 4/;
xC D a.3cA C 2/
2.3cAcB C 3cB C 5cA C 4/; xD D
a.3cA C 2/
2.3cAcB C 3cB C 5cA C 4/:
Sub-game perfect equilibrium of the dynamic game
The equilibrium outputs are
xA D 3a.cB C 2/.3cB C 1/
2.9cAc
2
B C 9c2B C 30cAcB C 23cB C 25cA C 12/
;
xB D 3a.3cAcB C 2cB C 5cA C 2/
2.9cAc
2
B C 9c2B C 30cAcB C 23cB C 25cA C 12/
;
xC D 3a.3cAcB C 2cB C 5cA C 2/
2.9cAc
2
B C 9c2B C 30cAcB C 23cB C 25cA C 12/
;
xD D 3a.3cAcB C 2cB C 5cA C 2/
2.9cAc
2
B C 9c2B C 30cAcB C 23cB C 25cA C 12/
:
TheNash equilibrium of the static game and the sub-game perfect equilibrium of the dynamic
game are not equivalent.
2.6 Case 6: all firms are symmetric
Assume cB D cC D cD D cA.
Nash equilibrium of the static game
The equilibrium outputs are
xA D a
2.cA C 2/; xB D
a
2.cA C 2/; xC D
a
2.cA C 2/; xD D
a
2.cA C 2/:
Sub-game perfect equilibrium of the dynamic game
The equilibrium outputs are
xA D a
2.cA C 2/; xB D
a
2.cA C 2/; xC D
a
2.cA C 2/; xD D
a
2.cA C 2/:
TheNash equilibrium of the static game and the sub-game perfect equilibrium of the dynamic
game are equivalent.
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3 Symmetric dynamic zero-sum game
There is an n-players and two-stages game. Players are called Player 1, 2, : : : , n. The strategic
variable of Player i is si ; i 2 f1; 2; : : : ; ng . The set of strategic variable of Player i is
Si ; i 2 f1; 2; : : : ; ng, which is a convex and compact set of a linear topological space. One of
players is the leader and other players are followers.
The structure of the game is as follows.
1. The ﬁrst stage
The leader determines the value of its strategic variable.
2. The second stage
Followers determine the values of their strategic variables given the value of the leader’s
strategic variable.
Thus, the game is a Stackelberg type dynamic game. We investigate a sub-game perfect
equilibrium of this game.
On the other hand, there is a static game in which all players simultaneously determine the
values of their strategic variables.
The payoﬀ of Player i is denoted by ui.s1; s2; : : : ; sn/. ui is jointly continuous in si and all
sj ; j ¤ i . We assume
nX
iD1
ui.s1; s2; : : : ; sn/ D 0 given .s1; s2; : : : ; sn/:
Therefore, the game is a zero-sum game.
We assume that the game is symmetric in the sense that the payoﬀ functions of all players are
symmetric, and assume that the sets of strategic variables for all players are the same. Denote
them by S . We do not assume diﬀerentiability of players’ payoﬀ functions3.
We show the following theorem
Theorem 1. The sub-game perfect equilibrium of the symmetric Stackelberg type dynamic
zero-sum game is equivalent to the equilibrium of the static game.
Proof. (1) Suppose that the leader is Player 1. Let .s2.s1/; s3.s1/; : : : ; sn.s1// be a solution
of the following equation;8ˆˆˆ<ˆ
ˆˆ:
s2.s1/ D argmaxs22S u2.s1; s2; s3.s1/; : : : sn.s1//
s3.s1/ D argmaxs32S u3.s1; s2.s1/; s3; : : : sn.s1//
: : :
sn.s1/ D argmaxsn2S un.s1; s2.s1/; s3.s1/; : : : sn/
3As we said in the introduction, we do not assume that the payoﬀ function is not diﬀerentiable. We do not use
diﬀerentiability of payoﬀ functions.
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given s1. Assume that argmaxsi2S ui.s1; s2.s1/; : : : ; si ; : : : ; sn.s1// for i 2 f2; 3; : : : ; ng
are unique. Since S is compact, ui.s1; s2; : : : ; sn/ for all i 2 f1; 2; : : : ; ng are jointly
continuous, by the maximum theorem s2.s1/, s3.s1/, : : : , sn.s1/ are continuous. We
have
max
si2S
ui.s1; s2.s1/; : : : ; si ; : : : ; sn.s1// D ui.s1; s2.s1/; : : : ; si.s1/; : : : ; sn.s1//; i 2 f2; : : : ; ng:
By symmetry of the game
s2.s1/ D s3.s1/ D    D sn.s1/;
and
u2.s1; s2.s1/; : : : ; sn.s1// D u3.s1; s2.s1/; : : : ; sn.s1// D    D un.s1; s2.s1/; : : : ; sn.s1//;
given s1. s1.s2/, s3.s2/, : : : , sn.s2/, s2.s3/, : : : , sn.s3/, : : : , s1.sn/, : : : , sn 1.sn/ are
similarly deﬁned. By symmetry of the game we have
s1.s2/ D s3.s2/ D    D sn.s2/; s2.s3/ D    D sn.s3/; : : : ; s1.sn/ D    D sn 1.sn/:
s2.s1/ is also obtained as a ﬁxed point of the following function
max
s2S
u2.s1; s; s2.s1/; : : : ; s2.s1//:
(2) The Nash equilibrium of the static game is obtained as a ﬁxed point of a function from
Sn to Sn; 0BB@
argmaxs12S u1.s1; s.1/; s.2/; : : : ; s.n//
argmaxs22S u2.s.1/; s2; : : : ; s.n//
: : :
argmaxsn2S un.s.1/; s.2/; : : : ; sn/
1CCA :
By symmetry of the game for all players we assume that s1 D s2 D    D sn at the
equilibrium. Denote the equilibrium by .Qs; Qs; : : : ; Qs/. Qs is also obtained as a ﬁxed point
of the following function.
max
s2S
u1.s; Qs; Qs; : : : ; ; Qs/:
We assume uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium of the static game. At the equilibrium
of the static game .Qs; Qs; : : : ; Qs/, we have
u1.Qs; Qs; : : : ; Qs/ > u1.s; Qs; : : : ; Qs/ for any s 2 S; s ¤ Qs; (1)
and
u1.Qs; Qs; : : : ; Qs/ D 0:
Similarly,
ui.Qs; : : : ; Qs; : : : ; Qs/ > ui.Qs; : : : ; Qs; : : : ; s; : : : ; Qs; : : : ; Qs/ for any s 2 S; s ¤ Qs; si D s;
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ui.Qs; : : : ; Qs; : : : Qs/ D 0
for i 2 f2; : : : ; ng. Note that
s2.Qs/ D argmax
s22S
u2.Qs; s2; Qs; : : : ; Qs/ D Qs;
and so on. Since the game is zero-sum and symmetric, we have
u1.s; Qs; : : : ; Qs/ D  .n   1/u2.s; Qs; : : : ; Qs/:
Thus, (1) means
u2.s; Qs; : : : ; Qs/ > 0:
By symmetry, we get
u1.Qs; s; Qs; : : : ; Qs/ > 0:
Therefore,
u1.s; Qs; : : : ; Qs/ < 0 < u1.Qs; s; Qs; : : : ; Qs/: (2)
Similarly,
u1.s; Qs; : : : ; Qs/ < 0 < u1.Qs; : : : ; Qs; s; Qs; : : : ; Qs/; si D s; i 2 f3; 4; : : : ; ng: (3)
Also we have
ju1.s; Qs; : : : ; Qs/j D .n   1/ju1.Qs; s; Qs; : : : ; Qs/j: (4)
(3) The equilibrium strategy of Player 1 in the dynamic game is written as
argmax
s12S
u1.s1; s2.s1/; : : : ; sn.s1//:
Let
s1 D argmax
s12S
u1.s1; s2.s1/; : : : ; sn.s1//:
.s1 ; s2.s1 /; : : : ; sn.s1 // is a Stackelberg equilibrium of the dynamic game when Player
1 is the leader. We assume uniqueness of the Stackelberg equilibrium. Similarly, we get
si such that
si D argmax
si2S
ui.s1.si/; : : : ; si 1.si/; si ; siC1.si/; : : : ; sn.si//:
By symmetry of the game
s1 D s2 D    D sn :
Denote them by s.
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(4) Since, by symmetry for Players 2 to n, sn.s/ D sn 1.s/ D    D s2.s/ for any s, we have
s D argmax
s2S
u1.s; s2.s/; : : : ; s2.s//:
This is equivalent to
u1.s
; s2.s/; : : : ; s2.s// > u1.s; s2.s/; : : : ; s2.s// for any s 2 S; s ¤ s:
Suppose a state such that s1 D s2 D    D Qs. From (2) and (3), for s ¤ Qs,
u1.s; Qs; : : : ; Qs/ < 0; : : : ; u1.Qs; : : : ; Qs; s; Qs; : : : ; Qs/ > 0 .si D s/; : : : ; u1.Qs; : : : ; Qs; s/ > 0 .sn D s/:
Since u1.s1; s2; : : : ; sn/ is jointly continuous, there exists a neighborhood V 0.Qs/ of Qs
such that, for s0 2 V 0.Qs/; s0 ¤ Qs
ju1.Qs; s0; : : : ; s0/j < ju1.Qs; s; Qs; : : : ; Qs/j;
and
u1.Qs; s0; : : : ; s0/ > 0;
for s which satisﬁes (2) and (3). Since the game is zero-sum,
u1.Qs; s0; : : : ; s0/C u2.Qs; s0; : : : ; s0/C u3.Qs; s0; : : : ; s0/C    C un.Qs; s0; : : : ; s0/ D 0:
By symmetry
u1.Qs; s0; : : : ; s0/ D  .n   1/u2.Qs; s0; : : : ; s0/ D  .n   1/u1.s0; Qs; s0; : : : ; s0/:
Thus,
u1.s
0; Qs; s0; : : : ; s0/ < 0 .s2 D Qs/; : : : ; u1.s0; s0; : : : ; s0; Qs/ < 0 .sn D Qs/:
Also we have
ju1.Qs; s0; : : : ; s0/j D .n   1/ju1.s0; Qs; s0; : : : ; s0/j:
Since u1.s1; s2; : : : ; sn/ is jointly continuous, if V.Qs/ is suﬃciently small, we can assume
ju1.Qs; s0; : : : ; s0/   u1.Qs; Qs; : : : ; Qs/j  .n   1/ju1.Qs; s0; Qs; : : : ; Qs/   u1.Qs; Qs; : : : ; Qs/j:
or
ju1.Qs; s0; : : : ; s0/j  .n   1/ju1.Qs; s0; Qs; : : : ; Qs/j:
Consequently, from (4)
ju1.Qs; s0; : : : ; s0/j  ju1.s0; Qs; : : : ; Qs/j:
There exists a neighborhood V.Qs/ of Qs such that for s 2 V.Qs/
ju1.s; s2.s/; : : : ; s2.s//j < ju1.s0; Qs; Qs; : : : ; Qs/j; for s0 2 V 0.Qs/:
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It seems to be that
js2.s/   Qsj < js   Qsj:
Since
u1.s; Qs; : : : ; Qs/ < 0;
and
u1.Qs; s2.s/; : : : ; s2.s// > 0;
we get
u1.s; s2.s/; : : : ; s2.s// < 0:
This means
u1.Qs; Qs; : : : ; Qs/ > u1.s; s2.s/; : : : ; s2.s//; for s 2 V.s/:
Thus, .Qs; Qs; : : : ; Qs/ is the Stackelberg equilibrium.
We have completed the proof.
4 Concluding Remark
As we said in the introduction, the equivalence of the Stackelberg type dynamic game and the
static game in a two-players zero-sum game is a widely known result. But, this problem in a
multi-players case has not been analyzed. In this paper we have analyzed a general n-players
game.
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